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4 WORKERS' COMPENSATION, WAGES, AND THE 
RISK OF INJURY 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
In many respects the structures of the workers' compensation and 
unemployment insurance systems are similar. Each is actually a system 
of individual state systems. Both are financed by a payroll tax that is 
imperfectly experience rated. Both provide insurance against an ad-
verse consequence (work injury or unemployment) that leads to time 
away from work; the incidence and duration of these events are at 
least partially determined by both employer and employee behavior. 
Both systems provide, at least for temporary events, a structure of 
benefits that ties compensation to a worker's previous earnings. 
Because of these similarities, it is not inappropriate for an in-
dividual such as myself, who has conducted some research on the 
unemployment insurance system but none on the workers' compen-
sation system, to provide an analysis and summary of the effects of 
the latter on work injury experience. Indeed, one contribution of this 
chapter will be to point out how lessons learned from research on 
other forms of social insurance can be applied to research on workers' 
compensation. Nonetheless, there are important differences in, and 
complexities of, the workers' compensation system that analyses of it 
must take into account; these are highlighted as well. 
I begin with a brief overview of the characteristics of the work-
ers' compensation system. I then sketch some simple labor market 
models that suggest how the system might affect employee compen-
7i 
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sation and the frequency and duration of work-related injuries. Crit-
ical analysis of the empirical literature on these effects follows. 
Characteristics of the Workers' Compensation System 
As mentioned above, the workers' compensation system is actually a 
composite of state systems; variations in the values of key parameters 
across states provide the basis of many of the empirical analyses dis-
cussed later.' Workers' compensation benefits are a form of no-fault 
insurance in which employers agree to pay specified benefits to work-
ers injured on the job in return for limited liability. The no-fault 
aspect of it, however, still leaves employers the right to challenge 
claims on such grounds as that the injury did not take place on the 
job, the injury is not as severe as the employee claims, or an injured 
employee is not returning to work as quickly as is possible. The fre-
quency with which claims are challenged may well vary across states 
(Burton and Berkowitz 1982, 80). 
Five types of benefits are paid under the workers' compensation 
system. First, medical benefits are provided to injured workers. Second, 
temporary total disability benefits are paid to injured workers who tem-
porarily cannot work at all but for whom full recovery is expected. 
There typically is a waiting period, which varies across states, before 
benefits commence, and the benefits are specified as a fraction of 
preinjury earnings. This fraction, the income-replacement rate, usu-
ally is set at two-thirds; however, each state specifies a minimum and 
maximum benefit level (the latter is often tied to average weekly earn-
ings in the state). 
Third, permanent total disability benefits are paid when an in-
dividual is permanently prevented from working at all. The structure 
of benefits is similar to temporary total disability benefits; in some 
cases there is also a maximum duration of time in which benefits may 
be received. 
Fourth, permanent partial disability benefits are paid for injuries 
that are expected, even after the healing period, to result in perma-
nent physical impairments and/or limitations on earnings capacity 
1. Much more detailed discussions of the workers' compensation system are 
presented elsewhere. For example, see Burton 1983, Burton and Berkowitz 1982, 
Victor 1983, Victor, Cohen, and Phelps 1982, and Worrall 1983. My discussion, which 
is unabashedly pirated from them, is necessarily brief and nontechnical. 
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and/or reductions in actual earnings. In many states, these benefits 
are determined ex ante (before the permanent consequences of the 
injury are experienced) and are not conditional on ex post loss of 
earnings, while in a few states, benefits for certain types of injuries 
(nonscheduled ones) depend on actual earnings loss. In these latter 
states, benefits for other types of injuries (scheduled ones) do not 
depend on actual earnings loss. In most states, however, nonsched-
uled benefits do not depend on actual earnings loss. Finally, burial 
and survival benefits are paid on death claims, which are a small 
share of claims. Permanent partial disability and temporary total 
disability are, in order, the two most important categories of indemni-
ty claims, based on dollar expenditures (together representing more 
than 80 percent of workers' compensation indemnity costs), while 
temporary total disability claims are by far the most frequent type 
of claims. 
Most firms purchase insurance against workers' compensation 
claims either from a government or private insurance carrier, de-
pending on the state (some states offer both options). Premiums are 
paid by employers as a percentage of total payroll. Small employers 
are manually rated, or charged a premium based on historical ex-
perience of the industry class to which they belong. As a result, their 
workers' compensation payroll tax is imperfectly experience rated in 
that, at the margin, they do not bear the full cost of workers' com-
pensation benefits paid to their employees. 
As an employer becomes larger, the manual rate is modified 
more and more to reflect the injury experience of the firm. Indeed, 
the rates of very large firms depend solely on their own historical 
experience; they are said to be perfectly experience rated (in principle, 
they bear the full costs of workers' compensation benefits received by 
their employees). Large firms also have the option of self-insuring, 
which also leads to perfect experience rating. In general, over a wide 
range of firm sizes, workers' compensation costs are imperfectly ex-
perience rated, with the extent of experience rating increasing with 
firm size.2 
Two final points warrant mention here. First, workers' com-
2. A more detailed discussion of experience rating is found in Victor 1983. 
John Burton has stressed to me that even very large firms are likely to insure themselves 
against catastrophes and thus not to have a 100 percent perfect experience rating. 
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pensation benefits are not taxable; thus their net worth depends on 
a worker's family income bracket. Second, recipients of workers' com-
pensation benefits may receive other forms of insurance benefits that 
are conditioned on either their disability status (e.g., Social Security 
or private disability payments) or their family income level (e.g., food 
stamps). Empirical analyses of the incentive effects of workers' com-
pensation benefits should (but typically do not) take into account both 
the tax treatment of workers' compensation benefits and the existence 
of these other forms of benefits. Both omissions may distort estimates 
of the incentive effects of workers' compensation. 
Workers' Compensation Effects: Theory 
Consider a simplified world in which the labor market is competitive, 
workers have perfect information about the risks of injury associated 
with each job, and there are no barriers to mobility between jobs.3 
Suppose also that firms differ in their production technology; that 
each technology has certain inherent risks of injury associated with 
it, which can be reduced if firms expend resources to do so; and that 
the marginal cost (to the employer) of reducing risks varies across 
firms. 
Assume also, initially, that workers value positively their ex-
pected earnings per period (earnings times the probability of not being 
injured) and value negatively the probability of being injured. Work-
ers will move to firms whose wage rates—risk of injury combination 
maximizes their well-being and, if all workers have identical prefer-
ences, firms with higher risks of injury would have to pay higher 
wages to attract workers. The mobility of workers would thus lead to 
fully compensating wage differentials, or wage differentials that com-
pensate workers for the disutility they would suffer from risk of 
injury.4 
In such a world, firms would offer the wage rates-risk of injury 
combination so that their marginal cost for injury reduction would 
3. The discussion here draws heavily on previous discussions. See the sources 
cited in note 1 as well as Chelius 1974, 1977, and 1983. I have again abstracted from 
inany details of the program and ignored a host of issues. 
4. If workers have different degrees of aversion to risk, they will sort them-
selves across firms so that those with the least aversion will be in the high-risk firms. 
The market wage differential between low- and high-risk firms will understate the wage 
differential that workers at low-risk firms would demand to move to high-risk firms. 
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equal their marginal benefits from injury reduction. The former in-
cludes the costs of resources devoted to preventing accidents, while 
the latter includes the lower bill for wages associated with the lower 
accident rate, less downtime in production, and reduced hiring and 
training costs of replacements for injured workers. If the marginal 
cost of preventing accidents varied across firms, different firms would 
offer different "wage-injury rate packages." 
In such a world, the introduction of workers' compensation 
benefits that were perfectly experience rated (and contained no load-
ing or administrative charges) would not affect the injury rate at any 
firm. Rather, because workers' compensation benefits would now com-
pensate workers if they were injured, smaller compensating wage 
differentials would be required to attract workers to firms with high 
injury rates. Thus higher workers' compensation benefits should lead 
to lower wages at each firm. Workers' compensation benefits would 
not affect the injury rate that was optimal from each firm's perspective, 
since the firm's reduction in wage costs would just be offset by the 
new workers' compensation costs. 
Suppose, instead, that workers' compensation benefits were not 
perfectly experience rated. In this case, the reduction in wage costs 
resulting from the payment of benefits would be greater than the 
employers' liability for the benefits. The marginal benefits of pre-
venting accidents would therefore fall, and employers would spend 
fewer resources on injury reduction. In this case, imperfect experience 
rating would lead to a higher injury rate than would exist either in the 
absence of the workers' compensation system or in the presence of a 
workers' compensation system that was perfectly experience rated. 
Of course all of the above presupposes a perfectly competitive 
labor market in which wage differentials arise to compensate workers 
fully for risk of injury. In such a world, if workers are risk neutral, 
there is in fact little rationale for a workers' compensation system.5 
If, however, fully compensating wage differentials do not arise, the 
5. If workers were risk averse, they would prefer the certainty of workers' 
compensation benefits when an injury occurs to a risk premium with the same expected 
value. In this case, the introduction of workers' compensation benefits would improve 
workers' welfare. One should caution, however, that in this situation, the resulting 
decline in the risk premium would exceed the actuarial value of the workers' compen-
sation benefits, which would decrease employers' incentives to prevent risks. Thus, 
again, the injury rate might rise relative to the injury rate that would prevail in the 
absence of the system. 
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predicted effects of workers' compensation benefits are quite 
different. 
Consider again the case of a perfectly experience-rated work-
ers' compensation system in which employers bear the full costs of 
the workers' compensation benefits paid to their employees. In this 
situation, in which wage differentials do not initially fully compensate 
workers for risk of injury, the marginal costs of injuries for employers 
would rise in the presence of workers' compensation benefits (wages 
would not fall sufficiently to offset the cost of benefits). As such, 
employers would have increased incentives to take actions to reduce 
injury rates, and one would expect to observe a decline in the injury 
rate.6 
From the employers' side of the labor market, then, the effect 
of the workers' compensation system or higher workers' compensation 
benefits on resources employers devote to reducing work injuries, and 
hence the injury rate, is ambiguous. If wage differentials do fully 
compensate workers for the risk of injury and the system is imperfectly 
experience rated, the injury rate may actually increase. If wage dif-
ferentials are not fully compensating and the system is perfectly ex-
perience rated, the injury rate will decrease. Empirical analyses are 
required to resolve the ambiguity. 
One should distinguish, however, between incentives for em-
ployers to increase resources devoted to injury prevention, and thus 
decrease the injury rate, and incentives for employers to reduce both 
the incidence and duration of workers' compensation claims. As long 
as workers' compensation benefits are at least partially experience 
rated, higher benefits will increase employers' incentives both to chal-
lenge claims and to encourage injured workers to speed their recovery 
and return to work. Even if increasing benefits does not alter employer 
resources devoted to injury prevention, it may affect the number and 
duration of claims. 
The above discussion focuses on the employer side of the labor 
market. Increasing temporary total workers' compensation benefits 
may also affect injury rates and claims by influencing employee be-
havior. First, higher benefits may reduce the disutility workers feel 
6. In a world where all workers' compensation costs are not shifted to workers, 
in the form of lower wages, or to consumers, in the form of higher prices, there also 
would be employment effects. See Ehrenberg, Hutchens, and Smith 1978 for a dis-
cussion of the evidence on the shifting of the payroll tax. 
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when they have minor and temporary illnesses. Thus higher benefits 
may reduce the precautions they take on the job to prevent accidents 
that are unlikely to lead to serious permanent injuries. Second, higher 
benefit levels increase employees' incentives to file claims for minor 
injuries in which the need to remain temporarily off the job is am-
biguous.7 Third, to the extent that workers at least partially control 
the speed at which rehabilitation from temporary disability occurs, 
higher benefits increase workers' incentives to prolong their recovery 
period. 
From workers' perspectives, then, higher temporary total dis-
ability benefit levels may lead to increased workers' compensation 
claims. Whether this is due to an increase in injury rates because 
workers use less precaution or to an increase in the probability of 
filing a claim, given a minor injury, is important to determine. Higher 
benefits may also lead to longer durations for individual claims; how-
ever, this does not imply that the average duration of claims would 
lengthen. If the higher benefits induce a lot of claims based on less 
severe injuries, the average duration of claims might actually fall. 
Permanent partial disability benefits may also affect workers' 
compensation claim rates and the supply of labor by disabled workers 
to the market. One must distinguish here between scheduled and 
nonscheduled benefits that are not contingent on actual earnings loss 
and nonscheduled benefits that are. In the former case, benefits typ-
ically are not contingent on work effort after the benefit determination 
date; they are specified as a lump-sum or weekly amount for a fixed 
duration. These benefits increase the injured individual's wealth (as-
suming medical expenses have also been fully compensated). To the 
extent that individuals value leisure time as well as income, higher 
scheduled benefits should lead to fewer hours of work and a reduced 
fraction of time in the labor force. 
In some states, however, such as New York and Florida, non-
scheduled benefits are specified as a fraction of earnings losses (prein-
jury earnings minus postinjury actual earnings), subject to maximum 
benefit levels. Benefits here are contingent on work effort and, like 
any income-transfer system of this type (e.g., Aid to Families with 
7. For both of these reasons, a decline in the length of the waiting period 
before benefits can be received would also increase the number of workers' compen-
sation claims. 
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Dependent Children), higher wage-replacement rates encourage re-
duced labor force participation and hours of work. Furthermore, the 
formulas used to compute benefits under such systems do not take 
into account that economic conditions may affect the earnings pros-
pects of injured workers; benefit levels do not depend on local un-
employment rates. Because higher unemployment rates reduce the 
actual earnings prospects of some injured workers relative to their 
nonscheduled permanent partial benefits, one would expect perma-
nent partial claim rates for nonscheduled benefits in these states to 
increase when unemployment rates are high. 
In sum, workers' compensation benefit levels, operating 
through both the employer and the employee side of the market, 
should be expected to influence the magnitude of compensating wage 
differentials, efforts by employers to reduce injury rates, injury rates 
per se, the number and types of workers' compensation claims, the 
durations of different types of claims, and the labor force attachment 
and hours of work of injured workers. It is to an analysis of the 
empirical evidence on many of these effects that I now turn. 
Compensating Wage Differentials 
The first issue is whether markets "work" in the sense that wage 
differentials arise to compensate workers for exposure to risk of in-
jury. Numerous studies have used cross-section data, with either es-
tablishments or individuals as the units of observation, and attempted 
to ascertain if wage rates are positively associated with various meas-
ures of injury risk (fatal accident rates, nonfatal accident rates, work-
days lost as a result of accident rates, and so on), after other personal 
characteristics that should influence wages (e.g., education, experi-
ence) are controlled for.8 
These studies uniformly tend to find that there is a positive 
association between fatal accident rates and wages. The relationship 
between nonfatal accident rates and wages is less well established, 
however; it appears in some studies but not in others. Most studies 
8. The pre-1979 studies are summarized in Smith 1979. Examples of later 
studies include Brown 1980, Burton 1983, Butler and Worrall 1983, Dickens 1984, 
Freeman and Medoff 1981, Olson 1981, Ruser 1986, Smith and Dillingham 1984, 
Viscusi 1978, 1979, and 1980, and Viscusi and Moore 1987. Recent attempts that use 
longitudinal data include Duncan and Holmlund 1983 and Moore and Viscusi 1987. 
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indicate that the magnitude of compensating wage differentials is 
larger in the union sector than in the nonunion sector,9 an expected 
result given that accident rates tend to be higher in the union sector 
and that unions may serve the role of winning wage differentials at 
the bargaining table to compensate their members for unfavorable 
job characteristics when "the market" fails to produce such differ-
entials (see Worrall and Butler 1983 and Duncan and Stafford 1980). 
The result, that compensating wage differentials are larger in the 
union sector, is not unique to risk of injury. Others have found similar 
results for such unfavorable job characteristics as mandatory overtime 
requirements (Ehrenberg and Schumann 1984). 
Somewhat surprisingly, many studies fail to consider the pos-
sibility that interstate, intertemporal, or interindustry variations in the 
generosity of workers' compensation systems, as measured by income-
replacement rates, might affect the magnitude of the differentials in 
compensating wages. The few studies that have do find that higher 
workers' compensation income-replacement rates reduce the mag-
nitude of the wage differential paid for a given risk of injury.10 One 
study has also found that higher risks of injury are associated with 
higher levels of fringe benefits and with higher wages (Dorsey 1983). 
Unfortunately, this voluminous literature provides very little 
that is of use for public policy. Presumably one wants to know if (1) 
the market is providing appropriate incentives for employers to take 
actions to reduce injury rates and (2) the market is fully compensating 
workers for risk of injury. As discussed below, no answer to either of 
these questions is provided by these studies. 
With respect to the first question, the issue is really whether 
the positive association between wages and risk-of-injury measures 
reflects a compensating wage differential for risk of injury. Jobs may 
offer a variety of undesirable working conditions in addition to risk 
9. See Dickens 1984, Freeman and Medoff 1981, Olson 1981, and Viscusi 
1979, for example. Smith and Dillingham (1984) find this result in 1973 data but not 
in 1977 or 1979 data. Ruser (1986) finds the result only for females. 
10. See Arnould and Nichols 1983, Butler 1983, Dorsey 1983, Dorsey and 
Walzer 1983, Ruser 1986, and Viscusi and Moore 1987. While all these studies agree 
that higher workers' compensation benefits are associated with lower wages, holding 
injury rates constant, they differ on how the level of workers' compensation benefits 
affects the marginal effect of injury rates on wages. For example, Ruser (1986) finds 
that higher benefits do not alter the wage-injury rate trade off, while Viscusi and Moore 
(1987) find higher benefits increase the marginal compensating differential for injury 
risk. 
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of injury; these may include having to work in a noisy environment, 
having to do repetitive tasks, being required to do heavy lifting, and 
lacking the opportunity to make independent judgments. Many of 
these job characteristics are probably highly correlated with risk of 
injury on the job, and workers may demand wage premiums to accept 
them. As a result, when one omits these other job characteristics from 
the analysis, any effect they have on wages is captured by the risk-of-
injury variable. Thus one may well overstate the true magnitude of 
the compensating wage differentials for risk of injury.11 When a few 
investigators have included other working conditions along with risk 
of injury in wage equations, the risk-of-injury variables tended not to 
be significantly associated with wages (see, for example, Brown 1980). 
Whether this is due to the high collinearity of the working conditions 
variables (which makes estimates imprecise) or to the nonexistence of 
a true wage-risk of injury differential cannot be determined. In either 
case, the evidence on the existence of compensating wage differentials 
for risk of injury is not as well established as the various studies would 
have us believe. 
Suppose we ignore this problem and assume that wage differ-
entials for risk of injury do exist. How could one hope to decide that 
their magnitudes are sufficiently large to permit one to conclude that 
they fully compensate workers for the disutility associated with risk of 
injury? Only if they are, as is implicitly assumed in a discussion of the 
subject in chapter 6 of the 1987 Economic Report of the President, is the 
case for government intervention to improve occupational safety 
weakened. Only if they are can one derive "value-of-life" estimates 
from them to use in benefit/cost studies of occupational safety and 
health interventions. (See Ehrenberg and Smith 1988, 272-76, for 
examples of such benefit/cost analyses.) 
Now, if one truly believes that all labor markets are competitive, 
it is a tautology that whatever wage differentials are generated by 
these markets will be "fully compensating" ones. Once one allows for 
market imperfections, however, the question becomes an empirical 
one. The mere existence of some wage differential does not imply that 
it is a fully compensating one. 
Estimates of the compensating wage differentials associated 
11. This criticism is really directed at the whole "compensating wage differ-
ential" literature and is not unique to studies of risk of injury. 
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with the risk of fatal injury at the workplace suggest that individuals 
are paid a premium of 1 to 4 percent of their wages to compensate 
them for existing risks of fatal injury; this leads (given the magnitude 
of fatal injury rates) to imputed values of lives in the range of $200,000 
to $3,500,000 (see Smith 1979). Researchers have no way of evaluating 
(nor have they even tended to consider) whether differentials in this 
range truly fully compensate workers for risk of fatal injury. 
As a result, the potential usefulness for public policy in occu-
pational safety of estimates of compensating wage differentials for 
injury risk is limited. On the one hand, if these estimates truly reflect 
differentials paid for risk of injury, they may provide only lower-
bound estimates of the value of life. On the other hand, if they also 
reflect a premium paid for other unmeasured unfavorable job char-
acteristics that are correlated with job risk, they may lead one to 
overstate the true value of life. 
Workers' Compensation Benefit Levels and Work Injury 
Experiences: State Data 
In theory, the incidence and duration of work injuries depends on 
both employee and employer actions. Given the discussion above, this 
suggests that both the level of benefits and the extent of experience 
rating should affect injury rates. Yet only two empirical studies, to be 
discussed below, have attempted to evaluate the effects of experience 
rating. The studies that use statewide data, or industry-by-state data, 
tend to ignore experience rating and stress the effects of benefit levels 
alone on the incidence and duration of injuries and/or claims. 
The nine studies summarized in table 4.1 fall neatly into three 
groups. First, there are three studies by James Chelius (1973, 1974, 
and 1977) that use a single year's data and find that, controlling for 
other factors, higher workers' compensation benefits are associated 
with a higher frequency of injury but have no association with du-
ration (severity) of injury. Second, there are two studies by Chelius 
(1982 and 1983) and one by John Ruser (1985) that use data for a 
number of years. Chelius (1982) uses data from thirty-six states for 
the 1972—75 period and finds that higher workers' compensation ben-
efits are associated with more frequent accidents but fewer days per 
case, so that on balance they have no association with the total rate 
TABLE 4.1. Studies of the Relationship between Workers' Compensation Benefit Levels and Injury Rate or 
Indemnity Claim Frequency and Duration that Use State Data as the Unit of Observation 
Study 
Chelius(1973) 
Chelius(1974) 
Chelius(1977) 
Chelius(1982) 
Chelius (1983) 
Data Period and 
Coverage 
1967 state-by-man-
ufacturing industry 
data 
1972-75 data by 
manufacturing in-
dustries for 36 
states 
1972-78 data by 
manufacturing in-
dustries for 28 
states 
Workers' 
Compensation 
Benefit Variable 
Workers' compen-
sation benefit level 
in the state and in-
dustry (actuarial 
estimates or im-
plied, given aver-
age wages, from 
laws)—weighted 
average of differ-
ent types of cases 
Workers' compen-
sation benefit level 
in state-industry 
cell for total tem-
porary injuries di-
vided by average 
earnings in cell 
(benefits implied 
by law given aver-
age earnings) 
(same as above) 
Outcome Variables 
BLS* 
Frequency of 
injury 
Severity of injury 
OSHA 
Frequency rate 
Days per case 
Lost workday rate 
OSHA 
Frequency rate 
Days per case 
Lost workday rate 
Effect of 
Higher Benefit 
Levels 
Increase 
No effect 
Increase 
Decrease 
No effect 
Increase 
No effect 
Increase 
Other Workers' Compensation 
Variables Included (Effect of 
Increase) 
Waiting period (decrease) 
(no effect) 
(decrease) 
Waiting period (no effect) 
(no effect) 
(no effect) 
TABLE 4.1 (continued) 
Stndv 
Data Period and 
Cnvpra ore 
Workers' 
Com pensation 
Rpnpfit Va r iah l r^iif<"r*rn#» V/a 
Effect of 
Higher Benefit 
Other Workers' Compensation 
Variables Included (Effect of 
Chelius(1983) 1972-78 data by 
manufacturing in-
dustries for 28 
(same as above) OSHA 
Frequency rate 
Days per case 
Lost workday rate 
Increase Waiting period (no effect) 
No effect (no effect) 
Increase (no effect) 
ii6ij&«£Sa»jfe!fc(*^*»v " 
TABLE 4.1 (continued) 
Study 
Workers' Effect of 
Data Period and Compensation Higher Benefit 
Coverage Benefit Variable Outcome Variables Levels 
Other Workers' Compensation 
Variables Included (Effect of 
Increase) 
Ruser(1985) 
Butler and 
Worrall 
(1983) 
Butler (1983) 
1972-79 3-digit 
manufacturing 
data for 41 states 
1972-78 data for 
35 states 
15 industries in 
South Carolina for 
a 32-year period 
Average weekly 
workers' compen-
sation benefit in 
the state-industry 
cell for temporary 
total disability 
Average weekly 
workers' compen-
sation benefit in 
the state for 
(a) temporary total 
(b) minor perma-
nent partial 
(c) major perma-
nent partial 
injuries (com-
puted from 
state laws, aver-
age wage and 
assumed wage 
distributions) 
Index of average 
real annual work-
ers' compensation 
payments for var-
ious types of 
injuries 
OSHA 
Frequency rate of 
cases 
Frequency of lost 
workdays 
NCCI claim rates 
for nonself-insur-
ing firms for 
(A) temporary total 
(B) minor perma-
nent partial 
(C) major perma-
nent partial 
injuries 
South Carolina In-
dustrial Commis-
sion statistics on 
Lost workday rate 
Death rate 
Permanent total rate 
Permanent partial 
rate 
Temporary total 
injury rate 
Increase 
Increase 
A B C 
a 
b 
c 
0 + + 
0 + 0 
0 — + 
Increase 
Increase 
Increase 
Increase 
No effect 
Waiting period 
Waiting period 
(B—decrease) 
(C—no effect) 
TABLE 4.1 (continued) 
Study 
Data Period and 
Coverage 
Workers' 
Compensation 
Benefit Variable Outcome Variables 
Effect of 
Higher Benefit 
Levels 
Other Workers' Compensation 
Variables Included (Effect of 
Increase) 
Worrall 
and Appel 
(1982) 
1958-77 data for 
the state of Texas 
I ncome-replace-
ment rate for tem-
porary total 
injuries in the state 
NCCI data 
Temporary total 
claims/medical-only 
claims 
All indemnity 
claims/medical-only 
claims 
Increase 
Increase 
SOURCE: Author's interpretation of material in the original articles. In the Butler and Worrall (1983) row, a " + " indicates increase, 
a "0" no change, and a " - " a decrease. 
*Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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of lost workdays. His later study (1983) uses data for only twenty-
eight states but a longer period (1972-78) and finds that although the 
workers' compensation benefit-frequency association is still observed, 
the benefit—days-per-case relationship vanishes. As a result, higher 
benefits are associated with an increased total rate of lost workdays. 
Whether the differences in results between the two studies reflect 
changes in behavior that occurred in 1976-78 or the dropping of 
eight states from the sample is not investigated by Chelius. 
Finally, Ruser (1985) uses data from forty-one states for the 
1972-79 period and finds that higher benefits are associated with 
higher frequencies of injuries and days lost from work. 
Focusing on Chelius (1982), one might ask how higher benefits 
could simultaneously increase frequency but decrease duration. Un-
fortunately, there are a number of possible explanations, which the 
data do not permit us to disentangle. Higher benefits might induce 
the reporting of minor injuries that otherwise would go unreported 
and that tend to be of short duration. They might also induce workers 
to take more risks on the job, but only in situations that would not 
lead to increased risk of serious long-term injuries. Finally, they might 
induce employers to concentrate accident prevention resources where 
long-term injuries are possible, to challenge long-term claims more 
frequently, or to "encourage" injured workers to return to work more 
rapidly. Presumably data on workers' compensation claims challenges 
are available; however, to my knowledge, no researcher has attempted 
to analyze whether challenges of claims by employers (either at the 
outset or while a claim is in progress) are related to the level of benefits. 
The third group of studies analyzes different types of data. 
Richard Butler (1983) focused on data from one state, South Carolina, 
over a long period and found that an index of average real annual 
workers' compensation payments for various injuries in the state was 
positively associated with the frequency of almost all types of injuries. 
Butler and John Worrall (1983) used workers' compensation claims 
data for thirty-five states over the 1972-78 period and computed 
estimates for each state and year of the levels of various types of 
benefits. They found benefit levels were associated primarily with 
permanent partial claims rates, not with temporary total ones. While 
an increase in the minor (major) permanent partial benefit level was 
associated with a higher minor (major) permanent partial injury rate, 
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an increase in the major permanent partial benefit level also reduced 
the incidence of minor permanent partial claims.12 
This latter result is intriguing in that it suggests that injured 
workers have some control over how they get their claims classified, 
whether as a major or a minor injury. Again, there is the possibility 
that at least part of the observed effect on injury rates may simply be 
a reporting effect.13 Evidence to support this view is presented by 
Worrall and Appel (1982), who found that higher income-replace-
ment rates for temporary total injuries have been associated over time 
in Texas with an increase in the ratios of temporary total claims and 
all indemnity claims to medical-only claims. 
Similarly, Chelius (1982, 239) found that frequency rates for 
injuries that involve no lost days appear not to be sensitive to benefit 
levels; because the waiting period in most states is at least three days, 
higher benefits offer workers no added incentive to report injuries 
in this category. He argues that any positive relationship here would 
indicate a real association between benefits and this short-term injury 
rate, and this relationship is not observed. Two studies (Chelius 1982 
and Butler and Worrall 1983) also found that longer waiting periods 
are associated with decreased injury rates or claims; whether this is a 
reporting or a real effect was not ascertained. 
Taken together, these studies strongly suggest that increases 
in workers' compensation benefits are associated with higher injury 
and claim rates, with at least some fraction of the increase being a 
pure "reporting" or "classification" effect. They do not, however, pro-
vide any strong evidence on duration of claims or injuries, primarily 
because increased frequency results in changes in the mixture, or 
types, of injuries reported. To analyze accurately the effects of benefit 
levels on the duration of claims requires data on individual claims; 
two such studies are discussed in the next section. 
The later studies described in this section are methodologically 
more sophisticated, controlling for more variables and using more 
refined data. Nonetheless, their conclusions should probably be tem-
12. Major claims are considered more serious than minor ones; the classifi-
cation depends on the magnitude of the indemnity payment for the injury. This raises 
the possibility that what is considered a major claim may vary across states. 
13. As noted above, Butler and Worrall (1983) find workers' compensation 
benefits have a larger effect on permanent partial than temporary total claims. The 
effect on permanent partial claims is unlikely to reflect primarily a reporting effect. 
;1 also reduced 
ts that injured 
aims classified, 
the possibility 
may simply be 
» presented by 
lcome-replace-
iated over time 
3tal claims and 
lency rates for 
iitive to benefit 
:ast three days, 
report injuries 
lip here would 
Drt-term injury 
$(Chelius 1982 
vaiting periods 
hether this is a 
that increases 
i higher injury 
icrease being a 
, however, pro-
iries, primarily 
le mixture, or 
ffects of benefit 
lividual claims; 
ethodologically 
rid using more 
obably be tem-
• ones; the classifi-
injury. This raises 
>s states. 
iers' compensation 
</ total claims. The 
reporting effect. 
Workers' Compensation, Wages, and the Risk of Injury • 87 
pered for at least two reasons. First, conclusions about the effects of 
workers' compensation benefits on rates of injuries or injury claims 
are essentially drawn from observations on the association between 
benefit levels and injury rates across states or on the association be-
tween changes in benefit levels and changes in injury rates over time. 
Very little concern has been expressed that high injury rates in a state 
create pressure to have generous benefits or that increases in injury 
rates create pressure to increase benefit levels. Put another way, there 
have been only limited efforts (see, for example, Chelius 1974) to test 
for the possibility that the direction of causation runs from injury 
rates to benefit levels, rather than vice versa. 
Second, the workers' compensation system is a complex system 
that involves much more than simply specifying the benefit level and 
waiting period. For example, presumably the extent of experience 
rating differs across states (and over time) as do administrative strin-
gency in processing claims and the propensity of employers to chal-
lenge claims.14 In contrast to research on unemployment insurance, 
where these factors have been considered, research on workers' com-
pensation has tended to ignore them.15 If these variables are corre-
lated with benefit levels, their omission will distort the relationship 
between the estimated benefit level and the injury rate. 
Benefit Levels and the Duration of Claims 
Butler and Worrall (1984) and Worrall and Butler (1985) have used 
data on individual workers' compensation claimants in the state of 
Illinois to analyze the effects of workers' compensation benefit levels 
on the duration of temporary total disability claims.16 The data are 
confined to one state to control for other aspects of the workers' 
14. The structure of experience rating is the same across most states at any 
point in time. The actual extent of experience rating in a state, however, will vary 
across states with the size distribution of firms, their wage rates, and their prior injury 
experiences. Hence, in principle, one can compute estimates of the extent of experience 
rating or of the proportion of firms that are (1) not subject to experience rating or (2) 
perfectly experience rated and use these in the analyses. There are, of course, obvious 
econometric problems with this approach. 
15. Studies of the effects of administrative stringency in the unemployment 
insurance literature include Solon 1984 and Horowitz 1977. Studies of the effects of 
experience rating include Brechling 1981 and Topel 1983. 
16. Their research builds on related work for Great Britain by Doherty (1979) 
and Fenn (1981). 
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compensation system and to one type of indemnity claim, those arising 
from low-back injuries, to mitigate the problem of varying mixtures 
of injury types, found in more aggregate data. The data come from 
a survey by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) 
of sample claimants in twelve states which began in April 1979 and 
followed the claimants for forty-two months. 
To analyze these data requires estimation methods that take 
account of the fact that some claimants are still receiving benefits at 
the end of the forty-two-month period. The two papers use appro-
priate methods, differing only in the specific stochastic assumptions 
and assumptions about unobservable variables that they make. These 
methods have previously been applied to problems of unemployment 
insurance and unemployment duration, so their papers build directly 
on research on another social insurance program. (See Flinn and 
Heckman 1982 and Lancaster 1979, for example.) 
Both papers yield the same important result, after controlling 
for other factors: the higher an individual's income-replacement ratio 
under the workers' compensation program, the less likely he or she 
is to leave claimant status and hence the longer the expected duration 
of his or her claim. A 10 percent increase in benefits is predicted to 
increase the average duration of a claim by .23 weeks (one day), which 
represents a 2 percent increase in the lengthening of the average 
claim (Worrall and Butler 1985). Whether this statistically significant 
result is large enough to be of "policy significance" is left to the reader 
to evaluate.17 
These papers represent, by far, the most sophisticated econ-
ometric treatments found in workers' compensation research, and the 
advantages of using data for a single state and type of injury are 
evident. Nonetheless, they are not without problems. 
In particular, at a point in time in a single state, the income-
replacement ratio an individual is scheduled to receive is a negative 
function of his or her previous earnings. To see why this creates 
problems, consider how the typical workers' compensation schedule 
operates. As the top panel of figure 4.1 illustrates, there is a minimum 
17. They also find that when a lawyer represents a claimant, the duration of 
the claim is longer. This returns us to the issue of administrative stringency and legal 
challenges. Their data permit them to analyze some of the influences that determine 
whether or not a lawyer is used. Another study that addresses this issue is Borba and 
Appel 1987. 
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Income-Replacement Ratio 
Income-
Replacement Ratio 
Previous 
Earnings (E) 
Figure 4.1 
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benefit level, Bmin, in the state. If an individual's preinjury earnings 
fall in the range Emin to Emax, then benefits increase with earnings. 
Individuals who previously earned Emax or more receive the maximum 
benefit level in the state, B^^. The bottom panel of figure 4.1 shows 
the implied income-replacement rate (BIE) for this schedule. It is 
constant (at about two-thirds in most states) between Emin and £max; 
however, outside this region it obviously is negatively related to pre-
vious earnings. 
If the income-replacement rate for an individual is an exact 
inverse function of his or her previous earnings, one cannot mean-
ingfully speak of varying the rate at a point in time independently of 
previous earnings. If both previous earnings and the income-replace-
ment rate appear to influence duration of workers' compensation 
claims, this may reflect only that previous earnings affect duration in 
a nonlinear fashion. Without independent variation in the income-
replacement rate, we cannot ascertain whether we are really estimating 
the effect of workers' compensation benefit levels on duration. 
Some independent variation may have in fact existed in Butler 
and Worrall's data.18 For example, some individuals received lump-
sum benefit awards rather than weekly benefits. In these cases, Butler 
and Worrall divided these amounts by the individuals' actual number 
of claim weeks to obtain a measure of their weekly benefits. This 
approach causes individuals with claims of randomly long duration 
to have randomly low reported income-replacement rates. Hence But-
ler and Worrall tended to understate the true effect of workers' com-
pensation benefits on duration. A further problem is that one would 
expect lump-sum awards to have a different effect on durations of 
claims than a contingent weekly award. Their approach does not 
permit this to occur. 
The conclusion one reaches here is that although using data 
from one state has its advantages, it also creates problems. One senses 
that data from more than one state are needed, although this would 
require researchers to take other characteristics of the state and state 
workers' compensation systems into account. Studies of the effect of 
unemployment insurance benefits on duration of unemployment have 
used individual data from more than one state, exploiting the inter-
state variation in replacement rates. (See, for example, Ehrenberg 
18. This paragraph draws on a telephone conversation with Richard Butler. 
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and Oaxaca 1976.) The twelve-state NCCI sample is a very useful 
data base for a similar analysis of workers' compensation. In a recent 
study, Worrall et al. (1985) used these data and found results that 
were very similar to the single-state (Illinois) studies.19 
Experience Rating 
In spite of the important role that experience rating plays in deter-
mining employers' responses (in theory) to an increase in workers' 
compensation benefits, there have been only two published attempts 
to analyze empirically whether experience rating affects injury rates. 
Chelius and Smith (1983) exploit the fact that small, manually rated 
firms are not experience rated, while very large firms are perfectly 
experience rated. The difference between injury rates in small and 
large firms within a single industry obviously will reflect many factors 
besides the difference in experience rating. If all else is equal, how-
ever, the higher the workers' compensation benefits in a state, the 
greater, they argue, the incentive faced by large firms in that state to 
reduce their injury rates, and thus the smaller the difference should 
be. They test whether experience rating matters by seeing if, across 
states, higher benefits are associated with lower values of the differ-
ence in injury rates between small and large firms in each of fifteen 
two-digit manufacturing industries. They conclude that their data do 
not permit them to ascertain any effects of experience rating; if pres-
ent, the effects are too small to be picked up with the crude data they 
use. 
In contrast, Ruser (1985) appears to find that experience rating 
matters. He uses the same line of reasoning as Chelius and Smith, 
but tests the "firm size" hypothesis by using pooled cross-section time-
series data for forty-one states from 1972 to 1979 on twenty-five three-
digit manufacturing industries. He enters an interaction term between 
the benefit level and firm size in his injury rate regressions and finds 
a negative coefficient. He attributes his finding that higher benefits 
appear to reduce injury rates more in states with larger firms (on 
average) to the greater likelihood that larger firms will face experience 
rating. 
19. Worrall et al. (1985) also use the Illinois data and find that higher benefit 
levels increase duration more for older workers than for younger ones. 
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Taken at face value, the results of Chelius and Smith's study 
suggest that the reduction in injury rates that increasing the extent 
of experience rating would bring about is so small that policy makers 
need not worry that many firms face imperfect or no experience 
rating. In contrast, Ruser's study suggests that increasing experience 
rating would significantly reduce injury rates. For a number of rea-
sons, one must be cautious, however, in drawing conclusions from 
either study. The first reason applies to both studies; the latter ones 
apply only to the Chelius and Smith study. 
First, within an industry, benefit levels vary across states, both 
because of differences in the generosity of state workers' compensa-
tion systems and because of interstate differences in average wages. 
The latter may reflect differences in the mix of skills workers possess. 
Any observed (or lack of observed) correlation between benefits and 
injury rate differences between large and small firms across states or 
between the average size of firms and the correlation of benefit levels 
and injury rates may reflect the interaction of the skill mix and firm 
size on injury rates. 
Second, average wage differences within a two-digit industry 
across states may reflect differences in the three- or four-digit industry 
mix across states, and there is no reason to suppose that the injury 
rate—firm size relationship is constant across three- or four-digit in-
dustries. This makes it difficult (using the Chelius-Smith method) to 
separate out the effects of workers' compensation benefits from the 
effects of industry mix. 
Finally, average wage differences across states may reflect dif-
ferences in the wage rate differential between large and small firms 
within states.20 If wage rates differ between firms in a state, injury 
rates may also differ, for reasons completely independent of expe-
rience rating.21 
One senses from all of this that efforts to estimate the effects 
of experience rating using aggregate state-by-industry data are not 
likely to prove fruitful, even when the data are stratified by firm size. 
At first glance, a more promising strategy appears to be to obtain data 
20. Consider the extreme case in which small firms in every state paid the 
same wage. A higher average wage in a state would reflect the higher wages paid in 
large firms and hence the greater wage differential between small and large firms. 
21. For example, wage differentials between large and small firms may reflect 
differences in skills; it is well known that injury rates are related to workers' skills. 
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at the individual firm level, to impute a marginal workers' compen-
sation cost variable per injury for the firm (using algorithms based 
on knowledge of the characteristics of the firm and the rules of the 
experience-rating system) and then to test for the effects of this var-
iable on future injury rates at the firm.22 
Unfortunately, the marginal cost per injury a firm faces, given 
its size and wages, will depend on its prior injury rate experience. To 
the extent that injury rates are correlated over time at a firm, this 
creates serious statistical problems; it may prove impossible to disen-
tangle the effect of experience rating on injury rates from the effect 
of injury rates on experience rating. While this effort is worth pur-
suing, it will require longitudinal data and a careful consideration of 
statistical issues. 
Workers' Compensation and Labor Supply 
Several studies have addressed the issue of how permanent partial 
disability benefits affect labor supply, highlighting the distinction be-
tween scheduled and nonscheduled benefits.23 William Johnson 
(1983) focused on workers injured in New York State in 1970 who 
were found eligible for scheduled benefits. These scheduled benefits 
are specified as weekly amounts for given durations; they are not 
related to actual wage loss during the period received. Johnson found 
small effects on the labor supply of benefit levels in 1971, but by 1974 
benefit levels appeared to affect neither labor force participation nor 
hours of work. He suggested that switching to nonscheduled benefits, 
which are contingent on wage loss, would have the obvious potential 
to decrease the labor supply. 
Some support for this view is found in Burton (1983). Burton 
used time-series data for New York State from 1959 to 1979 and 
found that increases in the unemployment rate were associated with 
a larger number of nonscheduled cases but not with any change in 
the number of scheduled cases. Workers' compensation payments in 
the former case are contingent on wage loss, and increases in the 
22. Victor (1983) has developed such an algorithm. 
23. A number of related studies estimate the effect of the Social Security 
Disability Insurance program on labor force participation rates. See, for example, 
Haveman and Wolfe 1984a and 1984b, Leonard 1979, and Parsons 1980a, 1980b, and 
1984. These studies tend to focus on the labor force participation rates of all older 
workers, not the rates for a sample of claimants as Johnson does. 
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unemployment rate make it harder for disabled workers to find jobs 
that compensate them at the level of their preinjury jobs. 
Burton also found, however, that higher benefit levels reduced 
the number of nonscheduled permanent partial disability cases. While 
it is possible that this reflects the dominance of efforts by employers 
to prevent injuries or injury claims over any reduction in actions by 
employees to promote safety, it must be stressed that this result flies 
in the face of all of the evidence summarized in table 4.1. Burton's 
twenty-year time-series analysis does not appear to control for changes 
in the industry/occupation/age/gender distribution of the labor force, 
all of which should influence compensation costs and injury rates (see, 
for example, Dillingham 1983). To the extent that these variables are 
correlated with changes in benefit levels over time, the observed effect 
of benefits on nonscheduled claims may actually reflect the effects of 
these other variables. 
Conclusion 
A long critical summary of the literature in an area requires no sum-
mary; however, several substantive propositions that have relevance 
for occupational safety and health policies are worth repeating. First, 
the evidence on compensating wage differentials for risk of injury is 
nowhere near as solid as producers of the evidence believe. On the 
one hand, even if we take estimates of differentials at face value and 
assume that all other nonrisk-related conditions of employment have 
been fully controlled for, the existence of a differential does not imply 
that workers are fully compensated for the risk of injury they face. 
At best, such estimates can be used to provide lower-bound estimates 
of the "value of life," which in turn can be used in benefit/cost analyses 
of various occupational safety and health policies. They cannot be used 
to draw conclusions about how well markets are working. On the other 
hand, if unfavorable nonrisk-related conditions of employment have 
not been controlled for (as is typically the case), and these are positively 
correlated with injury risk, the estimated wage differentials will over-
state the true compensating wage differential for injury risk and thus 
may provide overestimates of the value of life. 
Second, higher workers' compensation benefits do appear to 
increase the frequency-of-injury rates and workers' compensation 
claims, although we cannot separate out with any precision how much 
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of the increase is "real" and how much is merely a "reporting" effect. 
If the system is at least partially experience rated (which it is) and 
labor markets are not perfectly competitive (which they probably are 
not), higher workers' compensation benefits should induce employers 
to try to prevent accidents and/or to challenge more claims. That a 
positive relationship between frequency and benefits is observed im-
plies that employees' responses to higher benefits dominate, on bal-
ance, over employers' responses. 
The trick, then, is to alter existing policy to increase employers' 
incentives to improve safety without altering employees' incentives. 
One possibility is to hold benefit levels at their current real levels but 
to increase the extent of experience rating. As discussed above, there 
is no real evidence that this would work, and, in any case, such a policy 
would be strongly opposed by unions. Increased experience rating 
increases employers' incentives to challenge workers' claims for ben-
efits. For this very reason, unions have been vocal opponents of at-
tempts to increase experience rating in the unemployment insurance 
system. 
An alternative is to increase the payroll tax but not the level of 
benefits and to use the excess of revenue over benefits to fund other 
safety and health programs.24 To the extent that experience rating 
does matter, this will provide employers with increased incentives to 
improve safety. Similar proposals have previously been suggested with 
regard to overtime pay—increasing the tax on overtime hours but not 
the overtime premium paid to workers—and have been supported by 
at least some unions.25 
Of course, the fact that increasing workers' compensation ben-
efits does appear to increase the frequency-of-injury rates and/or 
workers' compensation claims does not imply in itself that further 
benefit increases are undesirable (or are desirable). Rather, it only tells 
us that there is a trade off between higher, more adequate benefits 
and higher injury rates and claims. Where along the trade off lines 
we ultimately locate will depend on policy makers' judgments about 
the optimal combination of adequacy and safety.26 For example, the 
24. Chelius (1982) has previously suggested this. 
25. See Ehrenberg and Schumann 1982, chap. 8, for a discussion of these 
proposals. The United Automobile Workers has been a noted supporter of them. 
26. Viscusi and Moore (1987) provide a methodological framework that can 
be used to help analyze the adequacy of workers' compensation benefits given the wage-
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results in Chelius (1983), taken at face value, suggest that raising the 
income-replacement rate in a state by 10 percent relative to the na-
tional average would increase the number of injuries per one hundred 
full-time workers in a state relative to the national average by 1.6 
percent. Whether such an action would, on balance, be desirable is 
for policy makers to decide. 
Finally, it is worth restressing that very little is known about 
the effects on the frequency and duration of claims of other char-
acteristics of the workers' compensation system, such as administrative 
stringency, the frequency of employer challenges, and the frequency 
of the use of attorneys in claims cases. Research on the causes and 
effects of these other characteristics would clearly help policy makers 
improve the design of the workers' compensation system.27 
injury rate trade off that exists. Their methodology requires, however, that accurate 
estimates of the trade off be obtained. 
27. Some suggestive evidence on how the benefits to litigating workers' com-
pensation claims vary across states is presented in Butler, Kearl, and Worrall 1984. As 
noted above, evidence on the variables associated with claimants' hiring of attorneys is 
found in Borba and Appel 1987 and in Worrall and Butler 1985. 
